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Increasingly, development scholars and practitioners are reaching for exceptional examples 
of positive change to better understand how developmental progress occurs. These positive 
outlying cases are often referred to as ‘positive exceptions’, but also ‘positive deviants’ 
and ‘pockets of effectiveness’. Studies in this literature promise to identify and examine 
positive developmental change occurring in otherwise poorly governed states. However, 
to identify success stories, such research largely relies on the reputations of cases, and, by 
doing so, overlooks cases that have not garnered a reputation for their developmental 
progress. This paper presents a novel three-stage methodology for identifying and 
examining positive outlier cases that does not rely solely on reputations. It therefore 
promises to uncover ‘hidden’ cases of developmental progress as well as those that have 
been recognized. The utility of the methodology is demonstrated through its use in 
uncovering two case studies in which surprising rates of bribery reduction occurred, though 
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the methodology has much broader applicability. The advantage of the methodology is 
validated by the fact that, in both cases identified, the reductions in bribery that occurred 
were previously unrecognized.   
 




 A growing literature has aimed to learn from exceptional examples of positive 
change in development. Such examples have variously been called ‘positive exceptions, 
‘positive deviants’, ‘pockets of productivity’, ‘pockets of effectiveness’, ‘islands of 
excellence’ and ‘islands of integrity’ (this paper favors the term, ‘positive outlier’).1 In 
common, these cases buck the trend of their poor governance environment by doing better 
than the norm. They include successful public sector reforms in an otherwise poorly 
governed state (e.g. Andrews, 2013, 2015; Tendler, 1997), institutions that deliver goods 
and services much better than other organizations set in the same challenging governance 
environment (e.g. Roll, 2011; Naazneen et al., 2014); individual leaders who, unlike their 
peers, work effectively to encourage developmental reforms (e.g. Leonard, 1991; Melo et 
al., 2012); and surprisingly positive developmental outcomes, for instance when the 
income of the poor outpaces expectations based on the trajectory of national wealth 
(Donaldson, 2008).  
 Studies researching these cases have sought to understand how it is that ‘some 
agents find better solutions to problems than their peers even though they have similar 
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resources as their peers and face similar challenges and obstacles’ (Andrews, 2015: 198). 
Each is also motivated by a desire to identify lessons that can be amplified, or ‘scaled up’, 
and applied to other institutions, and/or other countries, for greater effect (Ochieng, 2007: 
458). According to Andrews (2015: 198), focusing on these surprising success cases has 
promoted ‘learning about the strategies adopted to find and fit effective solutions’ and as 
such has ‘emerged as a way of identifying workable solutions to development’s toughest 
problems.’  
 However, the vast majority of positive outlier studies also have in common a 
potential limitation, one that may have caused researchers to overlook additional cases that 
are potentially instructive of the multifarious processes through which developmental 
reform is achieved. Most studies have relied on experts to identify the success cases that 
are scrutinized (Leonard, 1991; Grindle, 1997; Owusu, 2006; Roll, 2011; Melo et al., 2012; 
Andrews 2013, 2015; Naazneen et al., 2014). By relying on already established reputations, 
researchers risk overlooking cases where developmental improvement has occurred but has 
not already been recognized, or which, at times, have been dismissed by political 
opposition parties as pro-government or agency propaganda. Without identifying, and 
examining, these hidden cases, the effort to understand positive outliers misses valuable 
sources of data, and potentially some of the most surprising—and revealing—cases of 
reforms.   
 In this paper, we present a novel three-stage methodology for identifying positive 
outliers that promises to identify hidden and recognized cases of developmental progress. 
We present the methodology by describing each stage’s general features, as well as 
detailing a specific example of its application—our use of the methodology to identify 
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positive outliers of bribery reduction. While the methodology could be used to identify and 
examine a range of positive outliers in a broad array of areas, we demonstrate, through our 
case studies, that it successfully led to the identification of positive outliers that were 
otherwise ‘hidden.’  
 In the methodology’s first stage, potential positive outlying cases are identified as 
statistically significant outliers using simple regression analyses based on developmental 
outcome data. Our analyses—which relied on sector-specific bribery rates, drawn from 
Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (GCB)2—identified potential 
positive outliers as sectors in which the respective sectoral bribery rate had reduced far 
more than expected, given the rate of change in bribery experienced by other sectors in the 
same country over the same period.  
 In a second stage, potential positive outliers are vetted through a review of the 
literature and preliminary consultations with in-country experts to assess whether a case, 
initially identified as a potential positive outlier, should be excluded from further scrutiny. 
This step is important because measurement errors in the quantitative data may lead to 
statistical tests identifying false positives as outlying cases. In our application of the 
methodology, we vetted five cases.  
 The third stage is used, as far as possible, to conclusively confirm or refute the 
remaining potential positive outlier cases, and to identify their often surprising causes. This 
is done through a rigorous qualitative appraisal, with potential cases investigated through 
in-country fieldwork. In our study, we conducted fieldwork in two cases—South Africa, 
examining a reduction in police-related bribery, and Uganda, looking at a reduction in 
health-related bribery.  
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 By using statistical analyses of quantitative data on developmental outcomes to 
identify cases in the first instance, and then verifying or refuting these cases through a close 
qualitative examination, the methodology promises to identify cases of developmental 
reform that have not previously been recognized. In both our case studies—South Africa’s 
police and Uganda’s health sector—most close observers were unaware that the sectoral 
bribery rate had significantly reduced. As such, neither case had been subject to previous 
research related to the potential reduction in bribery. The relatively unacknowledged nature 
of both cases demonstrates that the methodology can identify and interrogate positive 
outlying cases that are relatively ‘hidden’.  
 The remainder of this paper reviews the means by which previous studies in the 
positive outlier literature have identified cases and highlights the potential limitations of 
this earlier research that our approach seeks to address. It then describes the three-stage 
approach used in our methodology in more detail, including a discussion of the statistical 
modelling employed, the vetting of cases and the approaches utilized in the qualitative 
fieldwork. We next establish the methodology’s usefulness in identifying ‘hidden’ positive 
outliers by demonstrating that the two positive outliers we uncovered, from our application 
of the methodology, were by and large previously under-recognized. These cases reveal 
important insights about how reform happens in practice—sometimes unintentionally.  By 
examining both the quantitative and the qualitative elements of our approach in detail, and 
the means by which this approach reveals new findings on how reform happens in practice, 
that departs from previous research, we hope to illuminate the strengths of this approach 




Literature review: How positive outliers are selected 
 Almost all positive outlier research has been conducted in two phases. An 
identifying methodology is used to choose a case or cases as potential outliers for 
examination, and qualitative research methods are used to analyses how and why actors, 
institutions or reforms within the exceptional case(s) perform so well (Pascale et al., 2010: 
7). Policy lessons are then drawn from what has been learnt. The lessons that one can hope 
to eventually learn are dependent on the selection of cases and, therefore, the means by 
which they are identified.  
 Despite the importance of the identification methodology, little attention is paid to 
the comparative benefits and limitations of the approaches used to identify cases that are 
eventually lauded.3 In 2008, Leonard boldly attempted to inventory and review the positive 
outlier and related literatures (see also Leonard, 2010). His review focused on cataloguing 
62 hypotheses from across the literature accounting for the emergence of various positive 
outliers. Surprisingly, however, little mention was made of the methodologies used to 
identify the cases reviewed.  
 Seminal pieces in this field that have followed Leonard’s (2008) review, each 
offering its own reviews of the literature, have also failed to critically review or even 
summarize the methodologies used to identify cases in the literature (e.g. Roll, 2014; 
Andrews, 2015). In a recently published critical review of ‘positive deviance’ literatures 
(which covers positive deviance literature or positive outlier in a range of academic 
disciplines, not just in development) by Herrington and van de Fliert (2017), the criteria on 
which cases of study are selected, and the impact selection processes may have had on 
conclusions drawn are not discussed at all. Consequently, our focus on critically assessing 
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the identification methodologies used in the wider literature, as well as offering a novel 
methodology for identifying potential positive outliers, makes an important contribution.  
 
Selecting cases based on reputation 
 The most common methodology, by far, used to identify cases of surprising success 
is reputational, which is when cases are selected because they are reputed to be successful 
performers (Leonard, 1991; Grindle, 1997; Tendler, 1997; Owusu, 2006; Roll, 2011; Melo 
et al., 2012; Andrews, 2013, 2015; Naazneen et al., 2014; Hertog, 2014; Hout, 2014; 
Pogoson & Roll, 2014; Simbine et al., 2014; Strauss, 2014; Willis, 2014). For example, 
Naazneen, Huybens and Vinuela (2014) asked World Bank staff in ‘fragile states’ to point 
out successful institutions.  Similarly, Leonard (1991: 11) selected his cases of four 
developmental leaders based on the recommendation of ‘many well-informed observers. 
 Some reputation-based case identification approaches are highly rigorous and, 
depending on the phenomenon under investigation, at times the most appropriate. 4 
However, there are at least two potential limitations that positive outlier research, reliant 
on reputational identification, may suffer from. First, as a reputational assessment is a 
subjective perception, a ‘good reputation’ may be misattributed and so may mask mediocre 
or even poor performance. When development agencies and organizations are involved, 
stories of developmental progress may be particularly susceptible to exaggeration (Berg, 
2000; Carothers & de Gramont, 2013).  Development agencies generally try to present their 
programs in as favorable a light as possible, and negative outcomes are often concealed or 
downplayed.  Strong incentives exist for development agencies and consultants to tell a 
good story about their own program’s success. The professional reputations of the involved 
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development bureaucrats are, to some extent, on the line when programs are evaluated and 
their effects are communicated. Development agencies face pressures to tell optimistic 
stories so they can demonstrate to taxpayers, legislatures and other policy-makers that their 
work is good value for money (Mosse, 2005; Unsworth, 2009: 890). Many monitoring 
systems also have a positive bias as program staff often avoid negative ratings that will 
draw attention and additional inspections (see, i.e. Mosse 2005).  
 The risk of relying on perceptions that misattribute success to a case can be 
overcome if a case’s status as a ‘positive outlier’ can be convincingly supported by 
triangulating perception data with other sources. To the literature’s credit, many studies 
using a reputational methodology describe additional steps taken to do this compellingly 
(e.g. Grindle, 1997; Tendler, 1997; Melo et al., 2012; Andrews, 2013, 2015; Naazneen et 
al., 2014). Naazneen et al. (2014: 16–17), for example, describe vetting cases initially 
identified by World Bank staff, through ‘secondary research and a round of narrative-based 
interviews with individuals with first-hand experience with the institutions.’ Somewhat 
similarly, Andrews (2015) started his search for outliers using a reputational approach by 
asking staff at Princeton University’s Innovations for Successful Societies (ISS)—a 
program that develops and banks case studies on successful reforms and developmental 
progress—to refer to him cases from ISS’s repository of countries ‘once considered fragile 
states’ that have since generated ‘sustained improvement in institutional performance and 
economic growth’. Forty cases were initially identified. Andrews then vetted the cases by 




 Yet even the most convincing case-vetting may not overcome a second limitation 
of reputation-based case identification. When the universe of cases considered includes 
only those already thought to be successful, unexpected cases of dramatic reform that have 
not yet been identified are overlooked. Put differently, other and potentially more 
exceptional cases may fly under the radar of a reputational identification methodology. In 
these hidden, and perhaps highly unexpected cases, developmental change may have not 
been recorded, or the records of such changes may have not received the same amount of 
publicity as cases more readily identified by observers, government actors or academics. 
A hidden positive outlier, for instance, may emerge in the performance of a highly 
specialized institution that the public (including observers trusted to give an assessment) is 
not equipped to assess. In other instances, it may be against the interest of certain influential 
groups to give credence to a story of success. Reluctance to acknowledge positive change 
may stem from a fear that a ‘success’ story will benefit political opponents, or that an 
acknowledgement of some progress may weaken the political commitments needed to 
encourage further progress.  
 Instances of developmental reform that tend to go unacknowledged or to be 
suppressed may have different drivers, characteristics and/or unintended consequences 
than those that are more easily identified. If we fail to recognize and understand the 
achievements made in under-observed cases, we miss the opportunity to learn what has 
gone right in these surprising outliers, in what circumstances and at what costs. We limit 
ourselves to learning from more visible cases and may therefore miss the opportunity to 
uncover insights from their less visible counterparts. This may stunt our ability to 
understand what drives developmental change. 
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 To our knowledge, within the positive outlier literature, only Donaldson (2008) has 
avoided using a reputational identification methodology. Inspired by the lauded one-to-one 
relationship that poverty reduction and economic growth had been generally found to have 
(Dollar & Kraay, 2001), Donaldson identified ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ outlier cases by 
first regressing the relationship between the change in the national incomes of the poor and 
growth in gross domestic product (GDP). He focused on the 27 country periods wherein 
income growth of the poor was significantly lower than the regression predicted— 
‘negative exceptions’—or significantly higher than what the regression predicted— 
‘positive exceptions.’ By relying on the hypothesized relationship between GDP growth 
and income growth among the poor to identify outlying cases, Donaldson’s study 
purposefully limited itself to focusing on why these 27 cases bucked this specific trend.  
 In our exercise of the methodology, we similarly use regression analyses to identify 
our pool of potential positive outliers. However, we focus only on sector-specific bribery 
data rather than on any other variables hypothesized to influence bribery or broader 
corruption patterns. This element of our methodology builds on the contribution that 
Donaldson (2008) made to the field. Donaldson purposefully identified cases that did not 
fit a hypothesized trend between two different indicators. By not initially relying on 
reputations or on a hypothesized relationship to explain why success may or may not be 
achieved, the identification methodology presented here promises to have the most 
potential for uncovering surprising cases of developmental progress that have not yet 
received acclaim and those that do not necessarily adhere to preconceived notions of why 




Statistically identifying potential positive outliers in bribery reduction 
 The aim of the first stage of the methodology is to statistically identify potential 
positive outliers. The statistical analysis relies on the availability of reliable and 
comparable cross-national development outcome data. An appropriate dataset would need 
to include measures of the extent to which a development outcome changed over time, 
across subnational units, within the countries included in the study.  
 As an example, in our application of the methodology, we sought to identify and 
research cases wherein bribery in specific sectors had unexpectedly reduced, and calculated 
country-level sector-specific bribery rates to do so. We relied on data from Transparency 
International’s GCB, which has the largest geographic and temporal reach on individuals’ 
responses to questions probing experiences with bribery, across multiple sectors (Peiffer, 
2012). In the latest wave (2015), 162,136 adults were surveyed in 119 countries.  
 Using responses to questions on whether a bribe had been paid to specific sectors, 
we calculated nationally representative country-level sector-specific bribery rates for all 
sectors included in the last four waves of the GCB (2009, 2010/11, 2013 and 2015).5 In 
each of these waves, questions were asked about bribes made to the medical, education, 
police, courts, utilities and permit (building and business) sectors. In all but the 2015 wave, 
questions were also asked about bribes made to the tax and land sectors. A single 
observation in this aggregated dataset, for example, is the estimated proportion of the 
Ugandan population in 2010 that had paid a bribe to receive health services. Given our 
interest in identifying surprising cases of bribery reduction (i.e. a change in bribery over 
time), we necessarily focused our attention on those country-samples that were asked about 
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their bribery patterns over at least two waves of the GCB. Table one shows the number of 
countries surveyed in different combinations of survey periods or wave pairs. 
 
Table 1: Number of countries surveyed in at least two waves of the GCB 
 N 
2015 and 2013 58 
2015 and 2010/11 52 
2015 and 2009 36 
2013 and 2010/11 51 
2013 and 2009 35 
 
While in our exercise we used bribery rates across several sectors, the 
methodology’s intuition could also be applied to identify positive outlying cases across 
demographic groups or geographic regions. For example, changes in subnational poverty 
rates in several different countries could be used to identify potential positive outlying 
regions wherein poverty decreased far more than what would be expected given the rate of 
change in poverty in other regions within the same country. 
 
Structuring quantitative models 
 Positive outliers are identified as the subnational units (e.g. sectoral or regional 
units) within a country where there has been an improvement in the development outcome 
of interest, when stagnation or a worsening is predicted. Depending on the data, simple 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression can be used to generate such predictions. In such 
analyses, the dependent variable is the change in development outcome of interest (at a 
sectoral, regional or other subnational unit level).  
 In our exercise of the methodology, five OLS regressions were used to generate 
predictions, each representing one of the five pairs of GCB waves (table one). Our 
dependent variables were the changes in the sector-specific bribery rates between the 
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earlier wave and the latest wave of data considered. We chose to treat all sectors together 
in the analyses, which is to say that, if six different sectors of data were available for a pair 
of GCB waves, the dataset was structured so that six different dependent variables for each 
country were specified. For example, for the analyses drawing on the 2009 and 2015 waves 
of data, there were six different dependent variables for each country examined, reflecting, 
respectively, changes in health-, education-, permits-, courts-, police- and utilities-related 
bribery rates. The purpose of this structure was to identify outliers across sectors, that were 
not-sector specific (i.e. one set of potential health bribery-related positive outliers identified 
independently from another set of potential education bribery-related positive outliers).  
 We suggest that all analyses include an index or other measure that can reflect the 
rate of change in the outcome of interest, for all subnational units considered (e.g. other 
sectors, other regions), other than the subnational unit that inhabits the dependent variable 
position. We used principle component factor analysis (PCFA)—a statistical technique 
used to reduce many variables into one or a few indices—to create our indices of wider 
changes in bribery rates. As an example, if the dependent variable was the change in bribery 
for the education sector, we calculated its respective index of wider changes in bribery 
from the changes in bribery for all sectors, except for education. With such an index 
included, predictions about the change in the outcome of interest for each subnational unit 
are based, in part, on the rate of change of the outcome of interest for all other comparable 
subnational units, over the same time and in the same country.6 Surprising cases, therefore, 




 Analyses should also control for a measure of the outcome of interest, at the start 
of the period scrutinized. This is a ‘convergence’ term; it is important because it accounts 
for the fact that potential improvement is a function of where an outcome started. For 
example, in our application, by including a convergence term, the model acknowledges 
that numerically small reductions in a bribery rate, from a relatively low bribery rate as a 
starting point, may be just as surprising, and therefore valuable to learn from, as cases that 
register numerically larger reductions but that start from a much higher sectoral-level 
bribery rate. Finally, in an examination of sector-specific outliers, where countries have in 
common the set of sectors considered, it may also be important to include dummy variables 
that represent the sectors scrutinized as dependent variables. Doing so accounts for what 
sector the dependent variable sector was (i.e. police, courts, health, permits, education, 
utilities, land). By including these variables, the models acknowledged that patterns in 
bribery changes may have sector-specific characteristics.  
 In our application, therefore, the resulting regressions use changes in bribery rates 
of all other sectors in the country to predict the change in bribery in the sector inhabiting 
the dependent variable position, while controlling for both the type of sector of the 
dependent variable and the bribery rate for the dependent variable sector at the start of the 
period scrutinized.7 The simplicity of the structure is intentional; if we were to include any 
other measures that we thought were linked to bribery patterns, the models would innately 
bias themselves towards a preconceived understanding of why it is that bribery rates 
increase or fall.8 By excluding all other potential factors from the analyses, the models are 
only able to identify when it is that a sectoral-level bribery rate falls out of sync with other 




Identifying potential positive outliers 
 Inspired by Donaldson (2008), potential positive outliers are determined 
statistically, by computing residuals, which is the distance between the regression line and 
each data point and calculating the probability that the distance is due to random variation. 
Data points that are far away from the regression line—outliers—show that the regression 
model is less likely to explain its position. In our case, an outlying sectoral bribery rate 
reflects a sector that experienced a change in its bribery rate that is unexpected, given how 
bribery levels have changed in the other institutions in the country.  
 To calculate the residuals, we subtracted the change in sector-specific bribery rates 
predicted by the model (column four in table two below) from the value reported by the 
GCB dataset (column three). We record this residual value in column five. Column six 
(labelled ‘outlier’) records the probability that the position of each case’s corresponding 
value for the change in its sectoral-level bribery rate is caused by random variation. This 
is estimated by calculating the P-values of the residual’s Z-scores to determine the chance 
that the point’s distance from the regression line is caused by random factors. As outliers 
exist along a continuum for how surprising they are, we flag observations as being outliers 
when there is an estimated five percent or less chance of occurring.10 
 
Table 2: Statistical outliers in bribery reduction 
Country Sector Δ Predicted Δ Residual Outlier 
2009 to 2013 
Uganda Health -5.0 11.2 16.2 <0.01% 
Lithuania Health -2.3 4.4 6.7 0.37% 
Mongolia Land -2.2 4.1 6.3 0.71% 
Malaysia Police -6.5 0.0 6.5 0.74% 
2010/11 to 2013 
El Salvador Police -18.5 -1.5 17 <0.01% 
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Uganda Health -17.3 -7.0 10.3 0.01% 
Indonesia Health -2.7 5.0 7.7 0.32% 
Thailand Health -7.1 0.0 7.1 0.39% 
Hungary Health -7.4 -1.0 6.4 1.00% 
2010/11 to 2015 
Burundi Health -29.6 -16.7 12.9 0.01% 
Azerbaijan Health -24.2 -15.5 8.7 1.00% 
El Salvador Police -16.9 -9.2 7.7 2.20% 
2013 to 2015 
Liberia Education -28.8 -14.9 13.9 0.15% 
South Africa Police -25.6 -15.6 10.0 4.24% 
2009 to 2015 
Azerbaijan Health -30.7 -13.1 17.6 <0.01% 
Senegal Permit -27.5 -15.2 12.3 0.60% 
Liberia Education -26.6 -17.2 9.4 2.32% 
Sierra Leone Education -28.1 -18.8 9.3 3.70% 
  
For instance, as seen in table 2, based on how bribery had changed in all other 
sectors measured, our analyses predicted that bribery to the health care sector in Uganda 
during the 2009 and 2013 period (first case listed) should have increased by 11.2 percent; 
the actual change over this period, according to the GCB, was a reduction of five percent—
a difference of 16.2 percentage points. Since the likelihood that random error can explain 
this data point is less than 0.01 percent, Uganda’s health care sector is considered a 
potential positive outlier in bribery reduction. Table two lists all identified potential 
positive outliers. While in some cases the reduction in bribery, according to the GCB, may 
seem small, the data suggests that these potential positive outliers are far from trivial. If we 
focus on just those four positive outliers identified from a comparison of the 2009 and 2013 
waves of the GCB, the analyses suggest that 4.6 million fewer people were asked to pay a 
bribe to receive the basic services specified in table two than what the model predicted.  
 
Stage 2: Triangulating statistical data   
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 The second step in the identifying methodology is to vet potential positive outliers 
with the primary aim of assessing whether the positive developmental change recorded 
statistically is negated, and demonstrably proven to be inaccurate, by those with a deep 
familiarity with the identified case. Important to note is that the aim of this stage is not to 
confirm the findings of developmental progress reflected in the statistical data, but instead 
to uncover evidence that will exclude cases from further analysis. Moreover, cases are 
excluded in this stage only when evidence is presented to strongly suggest that the 
statistical data on the case was wrong. This is because, especially in the cases of ‘hidden’ 
or unacknowledged positive outliers, evidence confirming that positive developmental 
change occurred may be disproportionately difficult to come by, or suppressed for various 
reasons. As such, if cases were excluded at this stage because confirmatory evidence was 
not found, the research could, once again, overlook examining ‘hidden’ positive outlying 
cases. This stage is particularly important to the identification methodology because 
measurement errors in quantitative data may lead to the statistical tests identifying false 
positives as outlying cases—cases where a positive developmental trend was recorded 
statistically but did not occur.  
 In our examination of cases of potential bribery reduction, five of the 18 statistically 
identified potential positive outliers were selected for further examination and vetting in 
stage two (table three). The selection of the five cases reflected additional criteria—specific 
to our project—including whether the country was eligible for official development 
assistance (a stipulation of our research grant) and whether conducting further research in 
these countries was feasible, given how difficult, expensive and/or potentially unsafe it 




Table 3: Cases vetted with desk research 
Country Sector Outlier time period(s) 
Uganda Health 2009–2013 and 2010/11–2013 
Indonesia Health 2010/11–2013 
Mongolia Land 2009–2013 
South Africa Police 2013–2015 




 Both statistical and qualitative data can be consulted to vet potential positive 
outliers. For instance, in our case, an effort was made to triangulate the sector-specific 
bribery rates that were computed from GCB data in the five cases we focused on. Three of 
the five cases are African, and so, as we did with the GCB, we computed country-level 
sector-specific bribery rates for these countries using Afrobarometer data. Like the GCB, 
in many of its waves Afrobarometer has asked nationally representative samples of 
individuals whether they have paid a bribe for specific services in the past year. In all three 
African cases, while sometimes the bribery rates differed between the two surveys, a 
comparison with Afrobarometer data similarly suggested that the sector that was identified 
as a potential positive outlier in our statistical analyses had experienced a considerable 
reduction in bribery over a similar timeframe. Unfortunately, we were not aware of a 
similar dataset that could be used as a comparison for the Mongolia and Indonesia cases.  
 We also consulted experts familiar with the five country sectors. These experts were 
identified using a snowball sampling technique that started with contacts drawn from the 
larger research teams’ personal networks of colleagues, former colleagues, academic 
contacts and friends, as well as emails to scholars in prominent area studies peer review 
journals who have published academic research on the cases. In total, we consulted fifty 
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identified experts, across the five cases. The experts represented a cross-section of 
academics, development practitioners, government employees in the country identified, 
officials in foreign aid agencies and non-governmental organization officers.  
 Correspondence with experts centered around whether they were aware of either 
supporting or countervailing evidence to suggest bribery had reduced in the sector (or 
indeed whether it had appeared to remain constant or to increase), and whether their 
experience within the sector indicated that a reduction in bribery may or may not have 
occurred. Gauging perceptions at this stage, rather than initially, ensured that reputational 
data alone was not used to qualify or disqualify a case from being considered as a potential 
positive outlier.  
 In our examination of potential bribery reduction, all five cases vetted in stage two 
passed stage two’s test—which is to say that we did not uncover any evidence to 
demonstrably prove that the underlying data, showing that bribery had reduced, was wrong. 
Our research budget required that we select only two of the five cases vetted in stage two 
for the fieldwork of stage three. We selected South Africa and Uganda to research their 
police and health sectors, respectively, because our research team had generated a large 
network of relevant informants and we were confident that our research budget would 
support fieldwork in each case. It is important to reiterate, however, that each of the other 
cases could have been researched in stage three because each passed stage two’s vetting.  
 
Stage 3: In-country case study fieldwork 
 The third and final stage of the methodology involves in-depth qualitative 
fieldwork. Two aims drive stage three—though only the first aim is related to the 
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identification of positive outliers, which is our focus here. This is to further vet the cases 
using data unearthed in the field. This is potentially important because evidence only 
accessible in the field may support or undermine the cases’ ‘positive outlier’ status.  
 The second aim of stage three, which does not relate to the identification of a 
positive outlier, is to assess why and how positive developmental change occurred. It is 
hoped that the lessons learnt at this stage will help scholars and policy-makers better 
understand how positive developmental change happens, and the various knock-on effects 
such improvements may generate as a result. As this paper focuses on the methodology’s 
utility in identifying positive outliers, we do not describe the specific assessments in our 
application of the methodology of how bribery reduced in each country sector. These 
examinations are described at length in our case study papers (Peiffer, Marquette, 
Armytage and Budhram 2018; Peiffer, Armytage & Marquette, 2018). However, a brief 
note is made of them here because they help explain why it is that the cases we identified 
may have eluded previous detection.  
 In both South Africa and Uganda, we conducted five to six weeks of fieldwork. We 
partially relied on snowball sampling, starting with the contacts of the extended research 
team developed through stage two. In both country sectors, we sought to engage academics 
and researchers, relevant government representatives and journalists, while concentrating 
mainly on the practitioners best placed to explain changes to bribery-related behaviors 





 GCB data on South Africa indicated a dramatic and unexpected reduction in bribery 
in the South African Police Service (SAPS) between 2013 and 2015 (table two), while 
Afrobarometer data suggested that the police bribery rate started to decline in 2011. Our 
additional analysis of Afrobarometer data, identifying the region of each respondent, 
showed that the decrease was likely most dramatic in one of the nation’s rural provinces, 
Limpopo. In Limpopo, over this period, the police-related bribery rate reduced by nearly 
15 percent, while in all other regions, according to Afrobarometer data, the reduction in 
police-related bribery averaged at around four percent. During consultations with policing 
experts in stage two, few offered ideas as to why police bribery may have reduced, either 
nationally or in Limpopo. The experts consulted, however, were not able to present any 
evidence to suggest that bribery had not reduced. Consequently, we entered the field with 
a large pool of expert commentators with whom to consult but no strong leads on possible 
causes of a potential reduction. 
 Our research in South Africa led us to develop two hypotheses for why bribery to 
the police may have reduced. First, during the period scrutinized, a transformative policing 
technology—the Automated Vehicle Location (AVL) system—was introduced, which 
provided a new means to monitor the activities of road police. Our data indicates that, 
fearful of getting caught after implementation of this new technology, road police may 
initially have shown greater reluctance to request bribes. Second, in Limpopo, where 
bribery statistics showed the most significant reduction, a large-scale government 
crackdown on high-level corruption in the provincial government apparatus coincided with 
the period identified by the statistical data. During the crackdown, the province, and most 
notably the capital of Limpopo, Polokwane, received an influx of high-level corruption 
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investigators from Pretoria. During this extraordinary period, the high visibility of these 
forces in the capital and across the province may have unintentionally reduced the extent 
to which local, ordinary police were willing to break the rules and ask for bribes.11  
 
Uganda 
 In contrast with the South Africa case, following consultation with a broad range 
of experts on the health sector in stage two, we entered fieldwork ready to test and 
interrogate a hypothesis of government-led reform. Several experts consulted in stage two 
suggested that the activities of a relatively new Health Monitoring Unit (HMU) may have 
shaped bribery patterns in the sector.   
 In total, we interviewed 48 respondents in Uganda, including doctors, nurses, 
clinicians and administrators currently employed in the public health system; government 
officials from the health sector and other departments; employees of donor agencies 
engaged in health service delivery; and health care providers formerly employed in the 
public sector and now working in private practice; as well as academics, journalists and 
researchers.  
 In brief, the findings of the fieldwork conducted in Uganda over the course of five 
weeks enabled us to confidently conclude that bribery for health services had indeed 
reduced during the period noted. Most health workers we spoke with testified that they felt 
bribery had reduced. Our research highlighted the influential work of the HMU in 
generating a marked change in the behavior of health sector workers. Through surprise 
audits, highly visible arrests of health sector workers and public shaming, the HMU’s 
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efforts to combat corruption in the sector is likely to have made health workers especially 
cautious of requesting bribes from patients.12 
 
Promise realized: Uncovering hidden ‘positive outliers’  
 By not relying on reputational assessments in the first phase of the project, the 
presented methodology promises to enable researchers to identify and learn from cases of 
developmental change that can be instructive, and which may otherwise remain hidden. In 
our examinations of the police in South Africa and of health care in Uganda, the use of the 
presented methodology led us to uncover surprising instances of bribery reduction that had 
previously received little to no attention from academics or donors, or from policy-makers 
and the media, beyond those bureaucrats directly involved in the design and 
implementation of the programs that likely contributed to the noted reduction.  
 In the South African policing case, the statistical reductions identified in police-
related bribery nationally and in Limpopo province specifically were neither reported in 
the provincial or national media nor publicized by the South African chapter of 
Transparency International. In addition, no research or previous studies were identified at 
any of South Africa’s excellent centers for crime and policing research.  
 Three main factors may account for the lack of acknowledgement of this case. First, 
one of the interventions that may have contributed to a reduction in the police-related 
bribery rate may have done so only unintentionally. The government corruption 
intervention in Limpopo targeted high-level corruption within the provincial government, 
and not members of the South African Police Service (SAPS). Therefore, any impact it had 
on bribery rates among the police was neither intended nor monitored. Second, another 
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likely factor—the introduction of the AVL system—is relatively new and has yet not been 
evaluated for its potential impact on bribery patterns, and so its effectiveness in this respect 
has not been documented. Third, there was a culture of criticism among actors and 
observers familiar with the case. The SAPS routinely receive a high degree of public 
criticism as a result of major failings in performance and management, and many of those 
interviewed—policing researchers and commentators, as well as the police themselves—
were predisposed to critiquing the police and were both unaccustomed and reluctant to 
investigate potential improvements in performance. 
 The reduction of bribery we uncovered in Uganda’s health care system was also 
largely unacknowledged. The statistical reduction in the health-related bribery rate was 
similarly not publicized or acknowledged by the local Transparency International chapter. 
As noted earlier, we found that the activities of the president’s HMU had likely influenced 
bribery patterns; however, organizations involved in monitoring and supporting public 
health were unaware of the impact of the unit in reducing the willingness of health care 
providers to request bribes. Further, while the activities of the HMU have received a great 
deal of domestic media coverage, to our knowledge no rigorous assessment of its effect on 
the behaviors of health workers have been undertaken.   
 A variety of factors specific to the Ugandan health care case contributed to 
preventing recognition of the reduction in bribery. First, government and media sources 
covering the successes of the HMU focused primarily on the unit’s success in reducing 
drugs theft, rather than bribes requested at the point of service. The impact it was having 
on reducing bribery simply did not take center stage. Second, the HMU is highly 
politicized. Supporters of the current presidential administration praise the HMU, while 
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political opponents critique it for misdiagnosing the problems of the health sector and 
deflecting public attention from drug shortages and inadequate salaries for health workers. 
Consequently, many citizens dismiss claims of policy success as government propaganda. 
Finally, it is our assessment that health care service delivery has not improved as a result 
of or alongside the reduction in bribery (Peiffer, Armytage & Marquette, 2018). The health 
sector in Uganda continues to suffer from many severe issues, such as a very low doctor to 
patient ratio, low investments in the health sector, drug shortages, poor-quality facilities 
and equipment and very low salaries for health workers (Peiffer, Armytage & Marquette, 
2018). The persistence and severity of these failures are likely to have eclipsed the noted 
reduction in bribes paid for health services, ensuring bribery within the health sector has 
remained a marginal issue.  
 There is no clear consensus on what constitutes a developmental ‘success.’ A 
success for one group of stakeholders may well be perceived as a failure for another. In the 
cases we examine, bribery reduction is by no means an unambiguous indicator of 
successful development. However, the cases we have selected are positive outliers in that 
they demonstrate a statistically surprising reduction in bribery within a sector over a period 
in a country context where a general consensus exists that corruption is problematic and 
needs to be reduced. In both instances the hidden nature of these cases may in part reflect 
the fact that while bribery reduced, other elements of service delivery in each of the sectors 
have not improved for clients or citizens. The periods of bribery reduction identified in 
both cases are very recent and therefore it may be too early to say whether the bribery 
reduction documented will be sustained or will eventually have positive knock-on effects 
in the sectors scrutinized or on wider development patterns. While these cases may 
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demonstrate that bribery reduction is related to wider positive changes in service delivery, 
they may instead reveal that policy reforms lauded as a “success” in a discrete area such as 
bribery reduction will have little impact on development more broadly or even unintended 
negative effects on other dimensions and measures of developmental change. Importantly, 
the identification of these two cases allows for the examination of what relationship, if any, 
statistically surprising and relatively unacknowledged reductions in bribery will have with 
other development patterns.  
 
Conclusion 
 Research on positive outliers promises to provide new insights into how 
development can be done better by focusing on those cases where developmental progress 
has occurred against the odds. To date, existing research on positive outliers has overlooked 
an array of cases that fall outside of the observations of narrowly defined groups of experts. 
The methodology presented in this paper, in contrast, promises to identify both positive 
outliers that have received recognition as well as those that have not. By using statistical 
analyses of developmental outcomes to identify potential positive outliers in the first 
instance, and then verifying or refuting these cases through a close qualitative examination, 
the presented methodology can recognize cases of developmental progress that have not 
previously been celebrated.  
 The cases we identified through the application of the presented methodology 
suggest that instructive developmental reform stories can escape simple detection (i) when 
their ‘success’ in achieving discrete developmental objectives is the unintended result of a 
policy intervention, (ii) when the case has not been deemed to be of sufficient political 
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value to be monitored and ‘claimed’ as the success of a specific institution or organization, 
(iii) when the policy arena is highly politicized and/or subject to a culture of criticism 
and/or (iv) when improvements in one area are not echoed by improvements in other areas.  
 Hidden cases are important to scrutinize as they may have different drivers, 
characteristics and unintended consequences than cases identified through reputational 
means. The lessons ‘hidden’ cases have to teach are likely just as valuable to our 
understanding of how developmental progress occurs as the lessons we learn from cases 
that have already gained recognition. Our research into bribery reduction in Uganda’s 
health care sector, especially, highlights the circuitous and often unexpected nature of 
developmental progress and reform. In finding that health care service delivery has not 
improved as a consequence of an impressive reduction in bribery, the case demonstrates 
that some effective measures to control sector-specific bribery may do little to strengthen 
the sector as a whole or contribute to supporting the sector’s overarching mandate. The 
lesson is cautionary for those who advocate for, or otherwise support, all ‘effective’ anti-
corruption efforts as the means by which the end of capacity-building can be achieved. Our 
research further highlights the importance of examining single indicators of developmental 
reform (such as bribery reduction) with extreme caution and ensuring that the findings 
gleamed from quantitative data are scrutinized in context, and in tandem with rigorous 
qualitative appraisal.  
 This paper focuses on the identification of potentially ‘hidden’ positive outliers, but 
it is only through the rigorous examination of these cases that we can hope to learn valuable 
lessons. It must therefore be acknowledged that the examination of potentially ‘hidden’ 
positive outliers presents unique challenges. Given the unrecognized nature of these cases, 
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personal, professional and financial investments in fieldwork spent on these cases carry 
risk. As field researchers are tasked with the challenge of investigating a trend that few 
have considered or are aware of, it may be the case that little of value will be unearthed, or 
that the field researcher will uncover evidence in the field to prove that the identified case 
is not, as anticipated in the statistical data, a true success story. As some cases may be 
under-acknowledged because of the politicized nature of the developmental process, or 
may be politically volatile, field researchers may also confront the practical challenges of 
securing relevant permissions and interviews. However, the pursuit of these cases of reform 
is important—by not identifying and examining ‘hidden’ cases of outlying developmental 
progress, we have likely naturally limited our understanding of what drives developmental 
change. 
 To the best of our knowledge, our examination of bribery reduction is the first 
application of the positive outlier approach to an investigation of corruption reduction. 
Importantly, however, given access to adequately comparable statistical data, our method 
promises to be of use in uncovering positive outliers in a broad array of areas. Relying on 
cross-national, subnational poverty data, it could be used, for example, to identify positive 
outlying regions where poverty has reduced far more than what would have been expected 
given shifting poverty trends elsewhere within the same country. Another application could 
lie in using the methodology, for instance, to interrogate cross-national data on public trust 
in different public sectors, to identify sectors for which public confidence has grown far 
more than what would be expected given levels of trust in other sectors within the same 
country. Another welcome avenue for future research would be to apply the intuition of 
the presented approach to identify cases wherein positive developmental change acutely 
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and positively impacted the lives of the poor and/or other marginalized groups. It is our 
expectation that this method will contribute to enabling researchers to investigate much 
more fully the factors that contribute to the emergence of unexpected surprising 
developmental change—and to rigorously interrogate the notions of success and failure 





Agrawal, A. & Chhatre, A. (2011). Strengthing causal inference through qualitative 
analysis of regression residuals: explaining forest governance in the Indian 
Himalaya. Environment and Planning 43, 328-346. 
Andrews, M. (2013). Explaining positive deviance in public sector reforms in development. 
Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 
Andrews, M. (2015). Explaining positive deviance in public sector reforms in 
development. World Development, 74(74), 197–208.  
Barr, A., Lindelow, M., & Serneels, P. (2009). Corruption in public service delivery: An 
experimental analysis. Journal of Behavior and Organization, 72(1), 225–39. 
Berg, E. (2000). Why aren’t aid organisations better learners? Paper for EGDI Seminar, 
What Do Aid Agencies and Their Co-operating Partners Learn From their 
Experiences? 24 August. 
Carothers, T., & de Gramont, D. (2013). Development aid confronts politics: The almost 
revolution. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace. 
Davis, J. (2004). Corruption in public service delivery: Experience from South Asia's water 
and sanitation sector. World Development, 32(1), 53–71. 
De Sardan, J. P. (1999). A moral economy of corruption in Africa? The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 37(1), 25–52. 
Deininger, K., & Mpuga, P. (2005). Does greater accountability improve the quality of 
public service delivery? Evidence from Uganda. World Development, 33(1), 171–91. 




Donaldson, J. A. (2008). Growth is good for whom, when, how? Economic growth and 
poverty reduction in exceptional cases. World Development, 36(11), 2127–43. 
Grindle, M. (1997). Getting good government: Capacity building in the public sectors of 
developing countries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hasty, J. (2005) The pleasures of corruption: Desire and discipline in Ghanaian political 
culture. Cultural Anthropology, 20(2), 271–301. 
Herrington, M., & van de Fliert, E. (2017). Positive deviance in theory and practice: A 
conceptual review. Deviant Behavior, 1–15. 
Hertog, M. (2014). Comparative analysis: Deciphering pockets of effectiveness. In M. 
Roll, The politics of public sector performance: Pockets of effectiveness in 
developing countries. New York: Routledge. 
Heyman, J. and Smart, A. (1999). States and illegal practices: An overview. In J. Heyman, 
States and illegal practices. Oxford: Berg. 
Hout, W. (2014). ‘Confidence in our abilities’: Suriname's state oil company as a pocket 
of effectiveness. In M. Roll, The politics of public sector performance: Pockets of 
effectiveness in developing countries. New York: Routledge. 
Kaufmann, D., Montoriol-Garriga, J., & Recanatini, F. (2008). How does bribery affect 
public service delivery? Micro-evidence from service users and public officials in 
Peru. Policy Research Working Paper 4492. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Leonard, D. (1991). African successes: Four public managers of Kenyan rural 
development. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Leonard, D. (2008). Where are ‘pockets’ of effective agencies likely in weak governance 
states and why? A propositional inventory. Brighton: IDS. 
 
 32 
Leonard, D. (2010). ‘Pockets’ of effective agencies in weak governance states: Where are 
they likely and why does it matter? Public Administration and Development, 91–101. 
Melo, M. A., Ng’ethe, N., & Manor, J. (2012). Against the odds: politicians, institutions, 
and the struggle against poverty. London: Hurst Publishers. 
Mosse, D. (2005). Cultivating development: An ethnography of aid policy and practice. 
London and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Naazneen, B., Huybens, E., & Vinuela, L. (2014). Institutions taking root: building state 
capacity in challenging contexts. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Ochieng, C. M. (2007). Development through positive deviance and its implications for 
economic policy making and public administration in Africa: The case of Kenyan 
agricultural development, 1930-2005. World Development, 454–79. 
Owusu, F. (2006). Differences in the performance of public organisations in Ghana: 
Implications for public-sector reform policy. Development Policy Review, 24(6), 
693–705.  
Pascale, R., Sternin, J., & Sternin, M. (2010). The power of positive deviance. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Business Press. 
Peiffer, C. (2012). From islands of integrity to understanding the politics of corruption 
reduction. Phase 1: statistical identification of ‘positive outliers’. Research Paper 
21. Birmingham: Developmental Leadership Program. 
Peiffer, C., Armytage, R., & Marquette, H. (2018). Uganda’s Health Sector as a ‘Hidden’ 
Positive Outlier in Bribery Reduction. Research Paper 56. Birmingham: 
Developmental Leadership Program. 
 
 33 
Peiffer, C., Marquette, H., Armytage, P., & Budhram, T. (2018). The Surprising Case of 
Police Bribery Reduction in South Africa. Research Paper 57. Birmingham: 
Developmental Leadership Program. 
Pogoson, A., & Roll, M. (2014). Turning Nigeria’s drug sector around: The National 
Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control. In M. Roll, The politics of 
public sector performance: Pockets of effectiveness in developing countries. New 
York: Routledge. 
Roll, M. (2011). The state that works: ‘Pockets of effectivness’ as a perspective on 
stateness in developing countries. Mainz: Johannes Gutenberg University. 
Roll, M. (2013). The politics of public sector performance: Pockets of effectiveness in 
developing countries. New York: Routledge. 
Rose, R., & Peiffer, C. (2015). Paying bribes for public services: A global guide to grass 
roots corruption. London: Palgrave. 
Simbine, A., Attoh, S., & Oladeji, A. (2014). Taming the menace of human trafficking: 
Nigeria’s National Agency for the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons and Other 
Related Matters. In M. Roll, The politics of public sector performance: Pockets of 
effectiveness in developing countries. New York: Routledge. 
Smart, A. (1993) Gifts, bribes, and guanxi: A reconsideration of Bourdieu’s social capital. 
Cultural Anthropology, 8(3), 388–408. 
Smart, A., & Hsu, C. (2007). Corruption or social capital? Tact and the performance of 
guanxi in market socialist China. Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal 
Anthropological Perspective, 167–90. 
 
 34 
Strauss, J. (2014). Pockets of effectiveness: Lessons from the long twentieth centrury in 
China and Taiwan. In M. Roll, The politics of public sector performance: Pockets of 
effectiveness in developing countries. New York: Routledge. 
Tanzler, D., Maras, K., & Giannakopoulos, A. (2012). The social construction of 
corruption in Europe. Farnham: Ashgate. 
Tendler, J. (1997). Good government in the tropics. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
Transparency International (2019). Global Corruption Barometer. Retrieved from: 
https://www.transparency.org/research/gcb. 
Unsworth, S. (2009). What’s politics got to do with it? Why donors find it hard to come to 
terms with politics, and why this matters. Journal of International Development, 
21(6), 883–94. 
Walton, G. (2015). Defining corruption where the state is weak: The case of Papua New 
Guinea. The Journal of Development Studies, 51(1), 15–31. 
Willis, E. (2014). An enduring pocket of effectiveness: The case of the National 
Development Bank in Brazil. In M. Roll, The politics of public sector performance: 




Appendix A. Excluded samples from pooled GCB dataset 
This appendix summarizes the country-samples that are included in the GCB dataset, but 
are excluded from our analyses. 
1. Data before the GCB 2009 wave is not included. This is because there is little 
information available on the quality of these samples and many country samples were 
too small to be trusted as being reliable representations of the population (i.e. N<500).  
2. The patterns of responses to questions about religious corruption among Moroccan 
respondents for the 2010 GCB indicate that this country sample is likely biased.  
3. The GCB 2009 report notes that there were ‘errors in the implementation of the survey’ 
for the following countries: Armenia, Belarus, Cambodia, El Salvador and Georgia. 
4. GCB 2013: 
a. Data from Azerbaijan, Lebanon and Russia were excluded from Transparency 
International reports because contact rates were lower or higher than what more 
realistic estimates would produce. 
b. Data from Albania, Brazil, Burundi, Fiji, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malawi 
and Zambia were excluded from Transparency International reports because 
bribery rates were inconsistent with external data sources and/or previous GCB 
editions. 
c. Data from Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, South Sudan and Sudan 
are excluded because computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) was used 
but there is insufficient telephone coverage for the sampling method to return a 
nationally representative sample. 
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d. There was also clear under-representation of segments of the national population in 
Chile, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, India, 
Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra 
Leone, Vanuatu and Yemen.  
5. Urban only or otherwise non-nationally representative samples were excluded from the 
analyses. 




Country Year Reason Country Year Reason 
Bolivia 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Senegal 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Cameroon 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
South Africa 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Colombia 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Vanuatu 2010 Sample too small 
Dominican 
Republic 
2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Vietnam 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Ecuador 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
DRC 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Greece 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Mozambique 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Guatemala 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Nepal 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
India 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Rwanda 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Indonesia 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
South Sudan 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Kosovo 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Sudan 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Malaysia 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Yemen 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Panama 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Zimbabwe 2011 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Poland 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Albania 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
Senegal 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Azerbaijan 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
Venezuela 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Brazil 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
Vietnam 2007 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Burundi 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 




Country Year Reason Country Year Reason 
segment of national 
population 
Belarus 2009 Admitted errors Cyprus 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Bolivia 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
DRC 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Cambodia 2009 Admitted errors 
and urban only 
Egypt 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Cameroon 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Ethiopia 2013 CATI inappropriately 
used 
Chile 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Fiji 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
Colombia 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
France 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
El Salvador 2009 Admitted errors 
and urban only 
and sample too 
small 
Germany 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
Georgia 2009 Admitted errors India 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Indonesia 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Kyrgyzstan 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Iraq 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Lebanon 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
Kosovo 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Luxembourg 2013 Excluded from TI 
report and sample too 
small 
Morocco 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Madagascar 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Panama 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 




Country Year Reason Country Year Reason 
and sample too 
small 
Poland 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Maldives 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Portugal 2009 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
Mozambique 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Bangladesh 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Nepal 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Bolivia 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Nigeria 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Cambodia 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Pakistan 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Chile 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
PNG 2013 CATI inappropriately 
used 
China 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Russia 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
Greece 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Rwanda 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
India 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Sierra Leone 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 




2013 CATI inappropriately 
used and sample too 
small 
Liberia 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
and sample too 
small 
South Sudan 2013 CATI inappropriately 
used 
Luxembourg 2010 Sample too small Sudan 2013 CATI inappropriately 
used 
Mexico 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Vanuatu 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population and 
sample too small 
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Country Year Reason Country Year Reason 
Morocco 2010 Suspicious 
response patterns 
Yemen 2013 Clear under-
representation of 
segment of national 
population 
Peru 2010 Urban only/not 
national sampling 
Zambia 2013 Excluded from TI 
report 
 
1 This paper uses the term ‘positive outlier’ because the statistical methodology used to 
identify cases of surprising success relies on statistically significant outlying 
observations. 
2 GCB data is publicly available (Transparency International 2019). 
3 It is beyond the scope of this paper to exhaustively review all studies that fall within 
the fences of the positive outlier and related literatures. Such a task would be a difficult 
undertaking; arguably any time a researcher examines an effective policy, leader or 
institution, in a country with ‘weak governance’, they are looking at a positive outlier. 
Leonard (2008: 9) calls this a problem of the boundaries to the study of ‘pockets of 
productivity’. The review conducted for this paper resulted from an initial Google 
Scholar search for articles and books that refer to one of the following terms: ‘positive 
outliers’, ‘positive deviants’, pockets of productivity’, ‘pockets of effectiveness’, 
‘islands of excellence’ and ‘islands of integrity’, and we reviewed works that were 
referred to by others in the literature as belonging in the positive outlier literature.   
4 For example, when a researcher is interested in identifying positive outlying cases for 
which quantitative data is not available, reliable or valid, we believe that reputation-
based case selection is the most appropriate identification methodology to use. 
5  We restricted our analyses to those country samples reported to be nationally 
representative. We chose to exclude data from GCB waves prior to 2009 because there 
was little information available on the quality of the samples and many samples 
appeared too small to be trusted as reliable representations of the population (N below 
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500). As statistical outliers can arise as a result of errors in the data, a sincere effort was 
made to exclude questionable samples from the waves considered. Appendix A 
describes the samples that have been excluded and reasons for doing so. 
6 All factor analyses performed produced one factor with an eigen value over 1.00. 
7 The validity and reliability of cross-national bribery data has been questioned because, 
depending on context, people may have different ideas of what constitutes a bribe 
(Walton, 2015). By relying on within-country sector bribery rates to identify potential 
positive outliers, our analyses limit the extent to which different cross-national 
understandings of bribery influence case identification. Admittedly, our use of GCB 
data does to some extent assume there are shared national understandings of what 
constitutes a bribe, however. Others have argued that survey-based bribery data should 
not be trusted because people will be unwilling to admit to a strange enumerator that 
they have paid a bribe (Rose & Peiffer, 2015: 46). Many other scholars, however, have 
demonstrated that in many cultures the provision of bribes or associated gifts is not 
perceived to be shameful or taboo (Smart, 1993; de Sardan, 1999; Heyman and Smart, 
1999; Hasty, 2005; Smart and Hsu, 2007). Consequently, concerns regarding the 
sensitivity of discussing bribery with informants often reflect Western norms more than 
the lived realities of many informants in non-Western countries, and perhaps should 
not be used to shape our expectations of how respondents will act in developing 
countries where bribery is thought to be more pervasive or normal (Tanzler et al., 2012). 
Further, to the extent that this is an issue across countries, rather than within countries, 
our methodology should still be appropriate to use. 
8  There is also great potential merit in examining outlier cases of a theoretically 
informed (multivariate) regression model. Cases that are not well predicted by a 
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theoretically informed model may also provide insights that challenge or build upon 
established theoretical thinking. This is demonstrated in Agrawal and Chhatre (2011). 
9 As an example, an analysis structure is described below for police from 2010 to 2015: 
∆ bribery for police [bribery rate in 2015 – bribery rate 2010] = factor [∆ in bribery 
rates since 2010  for all other sectors] + convergence [bribery rate for police in 2010] 
+ dummy variables for sector of interest (1 for police, 0 for education, 0 for 
courts…etc.). 
10  Specifically, we calculated studentised residuals. This is because standardised 
residuals can be vulnerable to a specific bias; if an outlying observation exerts a lot of 
‘leverage’ in the model, it will shift the estimation of the relationships that it predicts 
outliers from. 
11 See Peiffer, Marquette, Armytage, & Budhram (2018) for our findings and analysis 
with respect to this case study. 
12 See Peiffer, Armytage & Marquette (2018) for our findings and analysis with respect 
to this case study. 
